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which addressed a creditor’s knowledge of alleged breaches of fiduciary duties by officers and 
directors.   
 When considering the knowledge of the debtor in the context of a statute of limitations 
analysis, the statute will begin to run when the plaintiff discovers, or by “reasonable diligence 
should have discovered his injury.”4  The Third Circuit set forth a three-step analytical 
framework to scrutinize whether a party is under inquiry notice.5  The analysis includes the “(1) 
precise nature of the claims now being asserted, (2) whether an objectively reasonable person 
would have realized the need to investigate further, and (3) what information such an inquiry 
would have disclosed.”6  If a Plaintiff is not under inquiry notice and has no knowledge of the 
claim during the applicable statute of limitations, tolling mechanisms may apply.7  
In In re AMC Investors, the Delaware district court reversed the bankruptcy court’s 
decision granting summary judgment in favor of the officers and directors (the “Defendants”) of 
AMC (the “Company”) because Eugenia, as the sole creditor, was granted derivative standing to 
file suit on behalf of the debtors of the Company.8  Prior to being granted derivative standing, 
Eugenia filed involuntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy petitions against the debtors, in which orders for 
relief under Chapter 7 were entered in 2009.9  In 2011, Eugenia was granted derivative standing 
to sue on behalf of the debtors and brought a claim for breach of fiduciary duty against the 
Company in the Delaware bankruptcy court.10  
                                                
4 Pomeranz v. Museum Partners, L.P., 2005 WL 217039, at *3 (Del. Ch. Jan. 24, 2005). 
5 EBS Litig. LLC v. Barclays Glob. Inv'rs, N.A., 304 F.3d 302, 305 (3d Cir. 2002). 
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
8 See In re AMC Inv’rs, LLC, 551 B.R. 148, 151 (Bankr. D. Del. 2016). 
9 See id. 
10 See id. 
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In 2015, the bankruptcy court granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendants, 
which was based on the Defendants’ statute of limitation defense.11  The bankruptcy court held 
that Eugenia’s claim was time-barred because Eugenia knew about Defendants’ conduct in 
2005.12  Eugenia and the debtors (collectively, the “Plaintiffs”) appealed summary judgment.13  
The Delaware district court, in reversing the bankruptcy court’s decision, pointed out that the 
bankruptcy court’s “… determination that none of Delaware’s tolling doctrines are available to 
Debtors was incorrect based solely on Eugenia’s knowledge.”14  Thus, the district court held that 
a creditor’s knowledge of alleged breaches of fiduciary duties should not be imputed upon 
debtors in a statute of limitations analysis.15  
 This memorandum will explore the district court’s holding and its implications in light of 
the appeal filed by the Defendants to the Third Circuit on July 26, 2016.  Part I of this memo will 
discuss the statute of limitations analysis set forth by both the bankruptcy court and the district 
court.  Part II will discuss the statute of limitations analysis under New York law.  Part III will 
discuss the larger implications of these differing statute of limitations’ analyses regarding section 
541 claims as well as the appeal to the Third Circuit and the current status of this case.  
I.  The Differing Analyses of the Delaware Courts   
A. The Delaware Bankruptcy Court’s Analysis  
In 2011, Eugenia was granted derivative standing to sue on behalf of the debtors and 
brought a claim for breach of fiduciary duty against the officers, directors, and/or shareholders of 
                                                
11 See id. at 152. 
12 See Eugenia VI Venture Holdings Ltd. V. Maplewood Holdings LLC (In re AMC Investors, 
LLC), 524 B.R. 62, 80-81 (Bankr. D. Del. 2015). 
13 See AMC, 551 B.R. at 153. 
14 Id. at 155. 
15 See id. 
American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review | St. John’s School of Law, 8000 Utopia Parkway, Queens, NY 11439  
 
the Company in the Delaware bankruptcy court.16  The bankruptcy court noted that a court sitting 
in equity is not bound by a legal statute of limitations under Delaware law.17  Nevertheless, 
because equity follows the law, certain circumstances call for the court to apply a statute of 
limitations through analogy.18  The bankruptcy court reasoned that a statute of limitations 
analysis was appropriate because alleged breaches of fiduciary duty are equitable claims that 
bear “a close resemblance” to legal claims.19 Under Delaware law, breach of fiduciary duty 
claims have a three-year statute of limitations.20  The statute of limitations period begins to run 
from the date of the alleged harm.21  
Plaintiff’s breach of fiduciary duty claims derive from the Defendants’ alleged 
mismanagement of the Company from 2003 to 2005.22  The bankruptcy court then reasoned that 
Plaintiff’s claims would be time-barred unless Plaintiff could establish a basis for tolling the 
statute of limitations.23  The three bases for tolling the statute of limitations under Delaware law 
are: “(1) inherently unknowable injuries, (2) fraudulent concealment, and (3) equitable tolling 
following a breach of fiduciary duties.”24  The statute of limitations will begin to accrue “upon 
the discovery of facts constituting the basis of the cause of action or the existence of facts 
sufficient to put a person of ordinary intelligence and prudence on inquiry which, if pursued, 
would lead to a discovery of such facts.”25  
                                                
16 See id. at 150. 
17 See AMC, 524 B.R at 80. 
18 See In re Lyn, 483 B.R. 440, 452 (Bankr. D. Del. 2012). 
19 See Vichi v. Koninklijke Philips Elec. N. V., 2009 WL 4345724, at *16 (Del.Ch. Dec. 1, 2009). 
20 10 Del.C. § 8106.   
21 Bren v. Capital Realty Grp. Senior Hous. Inc. 2004 WL 370214 (Del. Ch. 2004). 
22 See AMC, 524 B.R. at 80. 
23 See id. 
24 See id. at 81. 
25 Vichi, 2009 WL 4345724, at *17.  
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The bankruptcy court cited Bren v. Capital Realty Grp. Senior House, Inc., in which the 
Chancery Court determined that the statute of limitations could not be tolled merely because of a 
plaintiff’s lack of standing.26  Ultimately, the bankruptcy court held that Eugenia’s knowledge 
would be imputed to the debtors and, because Eugenia knew about the Defendants’ alleged 
breach in June 2005, the statute of limitations would not be tolled.27  Accordingly, the 
bankruptcy court found that the Plaintiffs’ claim was time-barred and granted summary judgment 
in favor of the Defendants.28 
B. The Delaware District Court’s Analysis  
 On appeal, the Delaware district court concluded that Eugenia’s knowledge of the 
Defendants’ alleged breach could not be imputed upon the debtors.29 Principally, the Plaintiff’s 
argued that the bankruptcy court did not explain its reasoning as to why Eugenia’s knowledge 
should be imputed to the debtors.30  Further, Plaintiff maintained that a statute of limitations does 
not run for a corporate entity, such as the Debtors, under Delaware law “until at least one 
innocent party has knowledge of the facts constituting the cause of action and obtains standing to 
sue on its behalf.”31  Notably, during the statute of limitations period, Eugenia did not have 
standing to allege the breach of fiduciary duty claims against Defendants.32  The Defendants 
disputed Plaintiff’s claim by arguing that any potential tolling of the statute of limitations would 
cease once a plaintiff, who may derivatively sue for the debtors, became aware of the breach.33  
                                                
26 Bren, 2004 WL 370214, at *4.   
27 See AMC, 524 B.R. at 81. 
28 See id. 
29 AMC, 551 B.R. at 155.   
30 See id. at 153.   
31 Id. 
32 AMC, 524 B.R. at 80. 
33See AMC, 551 B.R. at 153.  
American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review | St. John’s School of Law, 8000 Utopia Parkway, Queens, NY 11439  
 
Because Eugenia became aware of the potential breach in 2005, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s 
claim should be barred as untimely.34  
The district court’s analysis began by noting that the bankruptcy court applied the proper 
standards for a statute of limitations analysis for a court sitting in equity.35  However, the district 
court held that the bankruptcy court erred in its statute of limitations analysis, in that its inquiry 
should not have been based on Eugenia’s knowledge.36  Because the Debtors are the true 
plaintiffs who have a valid claim for breach of fiduciary duty against the defendants, “the 
relevant inquiry turns on a plaintiff’s ability to discover the claim.”37  Regarding the Debtors’ 
ability to toll the statute of limitations, the district court relied on Kahn v. Seaboard Corporation, 
where the court stated “reasonable reliance upon the competence and good faith of others who 
have assumed legal responsibilities towards a plaintiff have not infrequently been held sufficient 
to toll the running of an applicable statute of limitations.”38  Ultimately, the court found that 
Eugenia’s knowledge should not have been imputed to the Debtors for purposes of determining 
whether any of the tolling doctrines were available to the Debtors.39 
II.  Statute of Limitations Analysis Under New York Law  
 The procedural posture of AMC shows that both parties agreed with the three bases for 
tolling the statute of limitations followed under Delaware law, i.e., (1) inherently unknowable 
injuries, (2) fraudulent concealment, and (3) equitable tolling following a breach of fiduciary 
duties.40  The conflict between these adversaries derived from the question of whether Eugenia’s 
                                                
34 See id. 
35 AMC, 551 B.R. at 154. 
36 See id. at 155. 
37 See id. 
38 625 A.2d 269, 275 (Del.Ch. 1993). 
39 See id. 
40 See AMC, 524 B.R. at 81. 
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knowledge, as a lender to the Company, should be imputed to the Debtors of the Company.  
Under Delaware law, the applicability of any tolling doctrine depends upon a plaintiff’s ability to 
discover or perceive the alleged harm.41  As outlined by the Delaware district court, because the 
Debtors solely have a viable claim against the Defendants, the applicability of any tolling 
doctrine will depend upon the Debtors knowledge of the alleged breach of fiduciary duty.42  
Nevertheless, the facts of AMC may cause an alternate outcome in different jurisdictions.   
For example, akin to Delaware law, New York law recognizes breach of fiduciary duty 
claims as claims in equity.  Under New York law, section 213(7) of the New York Civil Practice 
Law and Rules (“CPLR”) would be applicable under the AMC facts.  For non-derivative breach 
of fiduciary duty claims, CPLR § 213(1) and CPLR § 214(3) are the germane sections of the 
CPLR, and the applicability of these sections depends upon the relief being sought.  However, 
because Eugenia brought it as a derivative claim, CPLR § 213(7) applies.  CPLR § 213(7) states, 
an action must be brought within six years that is “… by or on behalf of a corporation against a 
present or former director, officer or stockholder for an accounting, or to procure a judgment on 
the ground of fraud, or to enforce a liability, penalty or forfeiture, or to recover damages for 
waste or for an injury to property or for an accounting in conjunction therewith.”43 
 As with Delaware law, which depends upon the amount of time that has passed, under 
New York law a plaintiff’s derivative claims could be time-barred, as breach of fiduciary claims 
accrue upon the date of the breach.44  However, a claim for breach of fiduciary duty is tolled as 
long as the fiduciary relationship persists.45  A breach of fiduciary duty claim does not accrue 
                                                
41 See AMC, 551 B.R. at 155. 
42 See id. 
43 CPLR § 213(7). 
44 See CPLR § 213(7). 
45 See St. John's Univ., N.Y. v. Bolton, 757 F. Supp. 2d 144, 169 (E.D.N.Y. 2010). 
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until “until the fiduciary has openly repudiated his or her obligation or the relationship has been 
otherwise terminated.”46  Considering the same facts as in the AMC case, the Company became 
insolvent in 2005 and the board of directors voted to end operations, the fiduciary relationship 
between the Company and the Debtors ceased in 2005.47  Akin to Delaware law regarding tolling 
a limitations statute, if a plaintiff possesses relevant knowledge that would place the plaintiff 
under the duty to inquire further into a potential breach of fiduciary duty, the statute of 
limitations will not be tolled.48  
 The facts of the AMC case applied under either New York law or Delaware law would 
yield a similar result.  Because Eugenia originally brought suit in the Southern District of New 
York in 2005, it is clear that they had the requisite knowledge regarding the alleged claims for 
breach of fiduciary duty.49  As Eugenia’s claims against the Company were dismissed by 
summary judgment, they commenced the present suit on behalf of the Debtors in 2011.50  The 
Delaware district court’s analysis, as is applied in New York, places the impetus upon the 
Plaintiff to show that 1) they did not have the requisite knowledge of facts that would support a 
breach of fiduciary duty and 2) they were not placed on inquiry notice.  Because statute of 
limitations analyses are analyzed in courts of equity in both Delaware and New York, focusing 
on the knowledge of the underlying Plaintiff in a derivative suit is the most just result.   
III. Larger Implications & Conclusion 
The In re AMC Investors holding affects intricate procedural issues regarding legal 
claims brought through section 541 of the Code.  A party that brings a claim through section 541 
                                                
46 Golden Pacific Bancorp v. FDIC, 273 F.3d 509, 518 (2d Cir. 2001). 
47 See AMC, 551 B. R. at 149. 
48 Gleason v. Spota, 194 A.D.2d 764, 765 (1993). 
49 See AMC, 524 B.R. at 80-81. 
50 See AMC, 551 B.R. at 151. 
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on behalf of a debtor assumes the debtor’s interest in the claim.51  In other words, a legal claim 
brought through section 541 is solely the debtor’s cause of action.  Therefore, all relevant tolling 
inquiries and statute of limitations’ analyses apply to the debtors and not the creditor acting on 
the debtors’ behalf.52  Thus, this holding causes section 541 claims to be analyzed without any 
regard to the interests of the party instituting the claim on the debtors’ behalf.  
 On January 31, 2017, the appeal to the Third Circuit was dismissed for lack of 
jurisdiction because the district court’s order was not a final order.53 Finality in the prior 
proceedings was necessary for the Third Circuit to have jurisdiction to hear this appeal.54  
Although the appeal has been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and as of March 19, 2017 no new 
documents have been filed, the statute of limitations and imputation of knowledge analyses will 
both be dependent upon the Debtors knowledge of any alleged breaches of fiduciary duty by the 
officers and directors of the Company.  
Under both New York and Delaware law, the relevant inquiry for (1) a statute of 
limitations analysis and (2) imputation of knowledge are fact-specific inquiries.  The specific 
facts of each case will dictate whether the statute of limitations will be tolled or whether the 
knowledge of one party in a suit should be imputed to another.  Ultimately, the court may find 
that the Debtors had knowledge of the alleged breach of fiduciary duty.  This knowledge would 
cause the claim to be untimely.  However, if the Debtors did not have the requisite knowledge of 
the claim, the statute of limitations would be tolled and their claim would likely proceed.  The 
Appellant-Defendants may file another appeal any day, but as of now, this matter is closed.  
 
                                                
51 R. F. Lafferty & Co., 267 F.3d at 356. 
52 AMC, 551 B.R. at 155. 
53 In Re AMC Investors, LLC, et al, 16-3193. 
54 See id. 
